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P ay-for-performance incentive programs are born ofattempts to answer the following question: How can we
pay health-care professionals, and doctors in particular, so
that they will be motivated to provide high-quality care?
This question has several components that deserve careful
attention.
HOW SHOULD WE PAY DOCTORS?
How best to pay doctors is an interesting and long-standing
dilemma. George Bernard Shaw—a great critic of the capitalist
enterprise—once complained of the fact that “any sane nation,
having observed that you could provide for the supply of bread
by giving bakers a pecuniary interest in baking for you, should
go on to give a surgeon a pecuniary interest in cutting off your
leg, is enough to make one despair of political humanity."1
Following Shaw, there have been a long string of harsh critics
of the dominant fee-for-service payment model in medicine.
Buttressing these critics have been empirical studies showing
that physicians, on average, respond to the fee-for-service
incentive as expected, by providing more services, including
some that may be of marginal value, useless or even harmful.2,3
The opposite incentive however—paying physicians more for
doing less—has an equally fervent set of critics. When capitated
payment models came to the fore in the 1990s, both doctors and
patients rose up in protest.4 Creating an incentive system in
which physiciansmight earnmore bywithholding useful carewas
widely seen as a frontal assault on traditionalmedical professional
values. Doctors who might in any way consider promoting the
interests of insurers rather than patients have been called
“Schmoctors” among many other, mostly unprintable, epithets.5
In the meantime, US health-care costs are dramatically
higher, and rising faster, than costs in other countries.6 The
quality of care we deliver is, broadly speaking, mediocre.7 And
health-care purchasers are fed up with paying more and more
for a product of uneven or uncertain value.8 Given the central
role of physicians in health-care delivery and the long-running
arguments over how best to pay them, it should be no surprise
that one possible answer is developing a payment scheme that
gives doctors financial incentives to provide high-quality, cost-
effective care.
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM AND PAY-FOR-
PERFORMANCE
Among the core tenets of professionalism are that physicians
should work to ensure and improve quality and that patients’
interests should always come before personal or pecuniary
interests. But these are professional ideals; physicians face
many challenges in living up to them. Not the least of these
challenges is that payment systems, as noted above, can create
incentives for unethical behavior by setting the physician’s
pecuniary interests in opposition to high-quality care. In fact,
given the perverse incentives in physician payments, some-
times “professionalism” has become almost synonymous with
acting to protect one’s patients at financial cost to oneself.9
While altruism is an important virtue, this view of profession-
alism is disconcerting, first because it is unrealistic to expect
physicians to consistently and indefinitely do things for which
they are punished. Second, it is an incomplete, and disheart-
ening, view of professionalism that boils down simply to self-
sacrifice. Professionalism entails other important values as
well, including the existence of a collegial community, self-
regulation and commitments to science, teaching and quality
improvement.10
Pay-for-performance, meanwhile, aims to pay doctors more
when they deliver higher-quality care. In theory, therefore, pay-
for-performance will align both financial and professional
incentives towards quality, which should promote professional
values.11
But that’s an ideal view. In practice, these programs have
provoked tremendous consternation and worry, and in this
issue of the Journal, the Society for General Internal Medicine’s
Ethics Committee enters the fray with a position paper on ethics
and pay-for-performance.12 Full disclosure: I reviewed it during
its development. I thought then, and think now, that the report
is helpful because it focuses our attention on a series of
practical ways in which pay-for-performance programs might
go wrong. The list compiled by Wharam et al. is concise but
impressive and, more important, actionable. Some problems
relate to the newness of the field: definitions and measures of
quality are imprecise at best, and evidence that pay-for-
performance improves quality is scant. Recognizing these
problems can help establish a research agenda. Other problems
relate to the underlying risks that pay-for-performance poses to
vulnerable populations and the physicians who serve them.
Some of these risks might be mitigated with improved program
design. Yet another set of problems relates to the ways in which
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physicians might try to ‘game the system’ under pay-for-
performance, such as by treating to the measure. All of these
concerns are worthy of monitoring, at least, and many deserve
proactive attention in creating ethical pay-for-performance
schemes.
But let’s return to the basic question driving the develop-
ment of pay-for-performance programs. How should we pay
doctors so that they will be motivated to provide high-quality
care? The latter part of this question implies two suspect
assumptions about the medical profession. First, it assumes
that a major reason we suffer from relatively poor quality
health care today is that physicians aren’t yet sufficiently
motivated to do better. Second, it assumes that financial
incentives will increase that motivation.
My critique of the first assumption is concise and probably
obvious. Simply put, there are many barriers to high-quality
care today; I doubt that lack of physician motivation ranks in
the top 10. Most physicians are highly motivated to provide
quality care, but we practice in a meta-environment that often
makes sustainable quality improvement difficult.13 Without
addressing systemic barriers to creating a high-performance
health-care system, merely reforming individual physician
payments will have little or no effect.14,15 It may be for this
reason that physician pay-for-performance programs so far
have shown lackluster results in regard to improving quality.16
My critique of the second assumption may be less apparent,
and more provocative.
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES CAN BACKFIRE
The central premise of pay-for-performance is that if you pay
people to do something, they will do it more often. This premise
is so intuitively obvious it is rarely questioned, but the fact is, it
isn’t always true. A great deal of experimental evidence from
both social psychology and econometrics suggests that when
an activity is largely driven by internal motivations—such as
professionalism or pride in the quality of work one achieves—
adding an external (e.g., financial) motivator can actually
backfire, often dramatically.
The first and still perhaps the most famous example of this
was explored in Titumuss’ landmark book, The Gift Relation-
ship, in which he compared Britain’s voluntary, unpaid blood
donation system with America’s then pay-for-donation sys-
tem.17 America’s “rejection of altruism and choice of the
private market in blood donor systems” (p. 313), he claimed,
created a blood supply that was less stable, more expensive,
and less safe than could be produced through a purely
voluntary system. He was able to marshal little experimental
evidence for his theories, however, and economists at the time
were at a loss to explain how paying for blood might drive down
supply.18 Some psychologists, meanwhile, vigorously defended
the theory of operant conditioning, which predicted that
humans, like rats, when exposed to small repeated rewards
for a certain behavior would show increasing instances of the
rewarded behavior.19
The problem with operant conditioning theory, however, is
that it assumes no intrinsic motivation (on the part of the rat)
to accomplish the task—only the reward matters. But when
one undertakes a task that can be intrinsically rewarding,
such as the altruistic act of donating blood, adding an extrinsic
financial incentive might undermine, or “crowd out,” intrinsic
motivation. In fact, a great deal of subsequent empirical work
has supported Titmuss. By the early 1990s, according to
education researcher Alfie Kohn, “At least two dozen studies
have shown that people expecting to receive a reward for
completing a task (or for doing it successfully) simply do not
perform as well as those who expect nothing.”20 In fact, by
1999 there had been no fewer than four meta-analyses of this
issue, the largest of which included more than 125 studies and
concluded that “tangible rewards [have] a significant negative
effect on intrinsic motivation for interesting tasks, and this
effect show[s] up with participants ranging from preschool to
college, with interesting activities ranging from word games to
construction puzzles, and with various rewards ranging from
dollar bills to marshmallows.”21
A few examples are illustrative of some key details in this
large body of work. First, the crowding out of intrinsic
motivation by extrinsic rewards only takes place with interest-
ing activities. When researchers study repetitive, rote work,
such as replacing windshields, financial incentives work just
as economists predict.21,22 In such cases, intrinsic motivation
cannot be undermined, since it doesn’t exist at the outset.
Second, the negative effects of incentives can be very strong;
notmerely underminingmotivation, but causing a reverse effect
to that intended.18 In one carefully controlled study, when
volunteers were paid a small amount for their time, they spent
4 h per month less in volunteer work than those paid nothing.23
Third, the undermining effect is especially strong with small
rewards and can presumably be overcome, at least in the short
term, with very large rewards. When high school students
going door-to-door collecting donations were randomized to
three groups, those who received commissions of either 1% or
10% of their donations collected fewer donations than those
who received no commissions, but those who received 10%
collected more than those who received 1%.24 In the long term,
however, any financial incentive can alter the relationship
between the worker, the task and the payer in counterproduc-
tive ways. For example, when a day care center began to
charge a monetary penalty for parents who showed up late to
collect their children, the proportion of late arrivals increased
significantly—and it did not go down once the fine was
removed.25 A previously non-monetary relationship had been
transformed into an explicitly monetary one.
Fourth, intrinsic motivation is related to larger themes of
social responsibility, public trust, teamwork and civic virtue.
When a group of Swiss citizens was asked about locating a
waste repository near their town, 50.8% said they would be
willing to accept it. But when they were offered a monetary
incentive to do so, only 24.6% were willing.18
HOW THE “CROWDING OUT” PHENOMENON
WORKS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
The fact that paying for something can reduce its production
constitutes a major anomaly in economics because “it predicts
the reverse reaction to the one expected according to the relative
price effect.”18 As such, it’s not enough to demonstrate that it
can happen; to avoid it onemust understand how it can happen.
There are several related theories about how extrinsic
rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation. Individuals might
experience financial rewards as an external shift in the locus of
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control for their actions, causing a sense of impaired self-
determination. When rewards are perceived as controlling,
people “take less responsibility for motivating themselves.”18
Self-esteem is also weakened when it is no longer one’s own
idea to perform at a high standard. Deprived of the opportunity
to demonstrate personal interest and motivation, individuals
might reduce their work effort. Financial rewards can even
make individuals feel their competence is being questioned or
that their intrinsic motivation is unappreciated or is being
rejected. Finally, Deci and Ryan have postulated that “related-
ness” is an innate psychological need, suggesting that incen-
tives that functionally separate out individuals from the
groups within which they work can be destructive of intrinsic
motivation, self-regulation and well-being.26 This last theory
may hold special importance in professions that rely on the
existence of a collegial, mutually supporting and self-regulatory
community for their existence.10
Physicians are just the sort of people, and medical work is
exactly the type of work, where external performance-contingent
rewards are most likely to backfire. Practicing medicine is
intrinsically interesting, difficult and creative, and it demands
a strong commitment to professional excellence to do it well. Yet,
as Kohnnotes, “In general, themore cognitive sophistication and
open-ended thinking that is required for a task, theworse people
tend to do when they have been led to perform that task for
a reward.”20 This may be why Martin Roland, director of the
National Primary Care Research and Development Center in
England, believes that the “most damaging” long-term
consequence of pay-for-performance would be “if you ended
up with a system where, essentially, doctors only did
anything because they were paid for it and had lost their
professional ethos.”27
On the other hand, data on performance incentives and
theories on how they can undermine intrinsic motivation also
suggest some solutions. The greatest dangers for undermining
intrinsic motivation lie in: giving rewards to individuals rather
than teams, rewarding very specific tasks, imposing rewards in
ways that are perceived as externally controlling, and using
rewards that are too small. Incentives crafted to avoid these
problems can actually “crowd in,” or support, intrinsic moti-
vation.18 For instance, performance incentives for teams,
rather than individuals, improved on-time departures in the
airline industry;28 where pay-for-performance in medical care
has worked best, it has also been in the setting of rewarding
teams, groups or organizations rather than individuals.16,29
And, since rewards that are felt as controlling are likely to
undermine intrinsic motivation, rewards could be placed
under the control of recipients. One way to do this would be
to trust clinicians to determine whether particular measures
are appropriate for particular patients. The idea is called
“exception reporting,” which has been correlated with higher
performance scores in the British pay-for-performance sys-
tem.30 To cynics, it might seem naïve to trust physicians to
make such judgments, but social science research supports
optimism—trust is often repaid with trustworthy behavior. Tax
cheating, for example, is actually less common in communities
with looser tax oversight and more citizen engagement than in
communities with strict tax oversight.31
This analysis of pay-for-performance in context with profes-
sionalism and intrinsic motivation leads to a final, broad
conclusion. If pay-for-performance is to support professionalism,
it cannot be done to us, it must come from us. In other words, it’s
not enough for physicians to complain that pay-for-performance
is misdirected, inaccurate and risky. Wharam et al. make clear
that pay-for-performance today might be all these things12—but
the only way to solve these problems is for the profession to take
ownership of the quality measures development process.32 If we
can accomplish this—if the profession asserts its responsibility
for determining how to define, measure and reward for quality—
then pay-for-performance can promote not only high-quality
care, but other core professional values too, including profes-
sional autonomy, collegial oversight and self-regulation.
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